A really interesting account of both the high level decision making and the examples of life of a bomber crew. Regarded by many as the forgotten campaign of the war (there was no medal associated with this action).
The early stages of the war are of a service looking to define itself and show it's capability. Initially this was very limited with poor navigation, and engagement rules that meant planes were sitting ducks.
Throughout the whole war precision bombing was really a myth, sights and technology improved but it was a business with very high error margins. Arthur Harris always pressed for bomber capability, and blanket bombing of German cities. The costs were immense for the German cities involved and also for aircrew losses.
There was always tension between the bombing effort looking to win the war on it's own - in reality it could never have - and supporting an eventual land operation. It is probably true to say the bombing action delayed the land campaign and made it less costly when it did happen.
America also provided much effort, but concentrated on daylight operations with good fighter escort. The British campaign although independent eventually had to fall into line with the planning of D-day.
It is interesting to note the truly strategic resource bombing, such as oil supplies and refining only really occurred in the later war years. This is claimed to be the true war turning contribution.
Another interesting fact is that while Britain was truly flat out in war effort - effectively bankrupting herself and her future world standing - Germany was more sedate and measured in war production, hard to believe given the hardship for the population in Britain.
The last part of the book has a letter from Harris over the anticipated Japanese invasion - insisting that bomber force could be used to save massive casualties of a landing army. We all know what the Americans had in store in that campaign.
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